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William Christiansen and Dwane Sykes have, in their appellees1 
brief, restated the issues as though the contested matters had been 
tried. Such was not the case. Judge Mower dismissed both appellees 
without so much as a hearing on the motion for summary dismissal, let 
alone a trial on the merits. We restate the issues as we have framed 
them based on our appeal. No cross-appeal was filed by Christiansen 
or Sykes in the only case to which we were parties. 
ISSUES 
(1) Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
dismissing the defendants, Sykes and Christiansen, without a hearing 
ind prior to a trial on the merits? 
(2) Whether Judge Mower's finding that "Plaintiffs1 amended 
omplaint, as it now stands, does not state a cause of action" was 
roperly founded upon the pleadings? 
(3) Whether such a finding is justified even if based upon the 
pleadings as technically drawn when evidence indicates that a cause of 
action does in fact exist? 
REBUTTAL TO "FACTS" 
My opponents have attempted to prejudice this court by an 
erroneous statement regarding "alter egos" having been "in and out of 
bankruptcy several times". Simply not true! The limited partnership, 
University Avenue Development Associates, which was one of the 
Plaintiffs suing Christiansen and Sykes, had filed for court protec-
tion under Chapter 11 during the pendency of this action. 
Subsequently they, Christiansen and Sykes, sought a stay in the lower 
court proceedings based on that filing, but we resisted on the basis 
that we were suing them, not vice versa. There was no justification 
for a delay in proceedings since there was no claim by them against 
our partnership, the debtor. 
In order to justify such a stay, Christiansen and Sykes, filed a 
counterclaim out of season. We objected but the counterclaim was 
al lowed anyway. 
Later, when the partnership was trying to get out from under the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, Sykes objected. And even though 
his objection was groundless, the court allowed it and refused to 
grant our motion for dismissal of the bankruptcy proceeding even 
though the matter was moot at that point and there were no creditors 
unsatisfied. 
It is pure hypocrisy for them to lay the extensive delays on us, 
as though we were intentionally cumbering the court system, when it 
was their tactic to delay, not ours. We had nothing to gain by 
delaying. On the contrary, it was they who gained since they had 
achieved their objective by slandering our title to the point it was 
lost at trustee sale. 
"Fact" No, 3, as stated by Christiansen and Sykes, says that 
Zions Bank and their attorney "scared her (Virginia Flynn) off". Not 
so, it was Sykes blatant and fraudulent claims at having some kind of 
prior right to purchase the subject property which scared her and 
Zions1 attorney, to the point that Zions was concerned that if they 
concluded the transaction with Flynn, and it was later proved that 
Sykes did have some kind of valid claim, they would be in jeopardy 
from having consumated the transaction, 
REBUTTAL TO AGRUMENTS 
Each and every step taken by Sykes was an outrageous example of 
title slander. And it worked! We had been barred from selling the 
property or from reborrowing on it, due to his fradulent claims, and 
finally we were even being stopped from having the old obligation to 
Zions bought by a friendly party. 
Why did Sykes fight so vigorously to resist this transaction? 
Had Virginia Flynn acquired Zions1 position, the property would have 
still been there available to attach upon whatever legitimate rights 
Sykes had under his alleged purchase agreement. Why did he go to such 
great lengths to slander the title, which allowed the property to go 
to foreclosure and be bought by some third party who was supposed to 
be independent and apart from all the prior proceedings? Unless he 
had already arranged things with Christiansen? Christiansen was 
clearly his accomplice in the slander of title and subsequent fraud. 
In "Fact" No. 1, as stated in the Appellee Brief, Christiansen 
and Sykes admit that at the time of the filing of our action against 
*,hem we were "owners of a piece of land that was about to be sold at 
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trustee sale." And yet they argue on page 4, in their Summary of 
Arguments, that we had no interest in the property being slandered! 
Exactly the point, we did own the land until it was lost due to the 
great machinations of Christiansen and Sykes. This was precisely the 
basis or our complaint and one which has never been heard by the 
court. 
The assertion by appellees, Sykes and Christiansen, on page 6 of 
their brief, that "the lawsuit was filed after the property had been 
foreclosed and subsequently sold" is a baldfaced lie and Mr. Primavera 
and Mr. Sykes should be sanctioned for trying to mislead the Court to 
this extent! The record will clearly indicate that this action was 
filed prior to the foreclosure sale in question (R. 1-6). So to agrue 
a Wyoming case that doesn't even fit our circumstances is totally out 
of place. [Both Sykes and Christiansen were put on notice of our 
legal claims for damages prior to the time the trustee sale was set to 
go forward at noon on the 4th of May, 1983, (See Addendum "A" 
attached), the original complaint having just been filed along with 
our Lis Pendens (attached hereto as Addendum " B " ) . It was not until 
later that afternoon that the trustee's deed was filed of record (see 
Addendum MC" attached).] 
And while we did later acquiesce in Zions1 right to sell the 
property at trustee sale, we never condonned the tortious conduct of 
either Sykes or Christiansen which was the precipitant cause of our 
loss of the property. 
As regards our claims against Christiansen only, he is clearly 
charged in our complaint and other pleadings. Though we may have 
inadvertently failed to remention him by name in paragraph 3 of our 
prayer for relief, he was surely implicated by his complicity and 
should be covered by our final prayer which asks "together with such 
relief as the court may deem just and proper." 
Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
"every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings." 
Paragraph 30 of the Amended Complaint, as further amended by 
the stipulaton with Zions Bank (R. 1058), stated: 
That Plaintiffs believe and therefore allege that Defendant, 
William Christiansen, was merely a strawman purchaser and had 
already entered into an agreement with Defendant Sykes for 
the purchase and sale of the subject premises, and that 
Christiansen and Sykes together have conspired to defraud 
Plaintiffs of their rightful claims to the premises. 
What the Plaintiffs did in striking a deal with Zions is to 
absolve Zions of legal wrongdoing. While we acknowledged the validity 
of the deed which passed from Zions to Christiansen, by virtue of our 
stipulated settlement with Zions, at no time did we sanction or 
acquiesse in the slanderous and fraudulent actions of Sykes, aided and 
abetted by Christiansen. It is from the effects of these acts that we 
wish to recover damages. 
Black1s Law Dictionary1s definition of fraud is still very 
applicable to this case: 
It consists of some deceitful practice or willful device, 
resorted to with intent to deprive another of his right, or 
in some manner to do him an injury... Maher v. Hibernia Ins. 
Co. 67 N. Y. 292; Alexander v. Church, 53 Conn, bbl, etc. 
JM includes anything calculated to deceive, whether it be a 
single act or combination of circumstances... Actual fraud 
consists in deceit, artifice, trick, design, some direct and 
active operation of the mind; it includes cases of the 
intentional and successful employment o7 any cunning, 
deceptio"n~ or artifice usecT T£ cTrcumverHT" or cheat 
another.TT[our emphasis J. 
Restatement of the Law, Torts Second, Ch. 43, §871, "Intentional 
larm to a Property Interest" reinforces this definition: 
One who intentionally deprives another of his legally 
protected property interest or causes injury to the interest 
is subject to liability to the other if his conduct is 
generally culpable and not justifiable under the 
circumstances (p. 287). 
Restatement then catalogues the methods by which intended torts 
against property interests may be committed. Under Comment Tie., the 
Institute refers to "Fraud" in these terms: 
Fraud. The actor's conduct is fraudulent if tie intentionally 
causes another to act or refrain from acting by means of 
intentionally false or misleading conduct or by his 
intentional concealment of facts, etc. (§871, p. 290). 
The rule stated in this Section applies to one who assists 
another to commit a fraud. A third person who has not 
participated in the fraud but who acquires property with 
knowledge of the fraud is subject to liability to pay its 
value to the owner or to return it, since he became a tort-
feaser by the acquisition of the subject matter with know-
ledge of the fraud (Restatement of the Law,§871, p. 291) 
We charge Dwane Sykes as the principal tortfeasor. It was he who 
defrauded us by his lies and misrepresentations regarding his false 
claims to the property, his falsification of documents, his outrageous 
acts in slandering our title, making it impossible to market the 
property or even refinance it, which would have taken it out of jeo-
pardy and prevented the trustee sale from going forward, thus preserv-
ing the title for whatever legitimate claims he might have. We repeat 
the higher court's definition of a title slanderer: 
One who, without privilege to do so, publishes matter which 
is untrue and disparaging to another's property in land, 
chattels or intangible things under such circumstances as 
would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a 
third person as purchaser or lessee thereof might be deter-
mined thereby is liable for pecuniary loss resulting to the 
other from the impairment of vendibility thus caused. 
Restatement of Law on Torts, Vol. Ill, Sec 624, p. 325, as 
cited in dowse* ~ D o 7 i s Trust Co., 208 P.2d 956, (UT 1949). 
Sykes's fraud lies in his misrepresentations to us, Zions and 
Flynn of having a rightful claim to the property, his malice in asser-
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ting such knowing full well it was not true, his intent to induce 
reliance by the strenuous actions he took (filing false documents of 
record, etc.), which caused both Zions and Flynn to back out, which 
reliance was justified by the possibility his claim might be true (due 
to his having forged documents which appeared to give him a real 
claim), and which damaged the plaintiffs by the loss of the property. 
All of the elements are truly in place! And even though William 
Christiansen did not participate directly in each of these steps, he 
becomes jointly liable by virtue of his later actions which made the 
fraud and slander of title work. 
But what is really at issue before this court are not the merits 
of the case, which the appellees have attempted to argue, but whether 
the lower court ever allowed us to go to the merits of the case, which 
it clearly did not. And it has been abundantly established before 
this court on many prior occasions that: 
"A motion for summary judgment should be denied where the 
evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact which, if 
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, would entitle him 
to judgment as a matter of law." Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 
613 (Utah 1982). 
Summary judgment is proper only if pleadings, depositions, 
affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that moving party is entitled to 
judgment as matter of law; evidence, when viewed in light 
most favorable to loser, must show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact. Livingston Industries, Inc. 
l i walker Bank <& Trust Co., 565 P.2d 1117 (Utah 19//). 
The lower court has summarily dismissed our claims against the 
remaining two defendants under the mistaken belief that our settlement 
with Zions somehow disposed of the slander of title issue with its 
attendant fraud issue. In granting summary dismissal of our claims, 
Judge Mower has completely overlooked or disregarded the facts 
supporting the very real issues in our case. 
CONCLUSION 
This court has never allowed a party's claims to be dismissed 
summarily where there were yet issues of material fact to be decided. 
It has always held that causes of action should be decided on their 
merits. We ask the Supreme Court to reverse Judge Mower's decision in 
dismissing Sykes and Christiansen and remand this matter to lower 
court with instructions. We would also ask that our motion for sum-
mary judgment against Sykes on the slander of title issue be granted, 
pending a trial on the extent of damages sustained (R. 1334-61, R. 
1378-90). 
Respectfully submitted this y^y day of November, 1992. 
;crrf^as General Partner 
for University Avenue Dey. Assoc. 
individually 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Howard F. Hatch, certify that on // — *z-~7<Z-~^ I served a 
copy of the attached Reply Brief of Appellants on the following named 
parties or their attorney by hand delivery or by mailing it to them 
first class with sufficient postage to the address noted below: 
Mr. Dwaine J. Sykes. et al. 
1511 South Carterville Rd. 
Orem, UT 84058 
Spencer F. Hatch, Esq. 
19221 Sherborne Lane 
Huntington Beach, 
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ADDENDUM "A 
CORRECTED 
NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE 
The following described property will be sold at public 
auction to the highest bidder, Wednesday. May 4. 1983. payabl 
in lawful money of the United States at the tine of sale, at 
the front steps of the Utah County Courthouse, 51 So. 
University Ave.. Provo, Utah, at 12:00 noon of said day, for 
the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed executed by Howard F. 
Hatch and Marjorie S. Hatch, as trustors, in favor of ZIONS 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK, as beneficiary, recorded April 14. 1978 
Entry No. 14230 in Book 1637, Page 272-275, of the official 
records of Utah County, State of Utah, covering real property 
located at 1525 So. Cartervllle Road, Ores. Utah, and more 
particuiyMtty described as: 
H^inning at a point on the East side of 
Cartervllle Road, which point is North 
829.45 feet and East 1398.23 feet from the 
West Quarter Corner of Section 25. Township 
6 South. Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence North 3*05' East 62.66 
feet; thence south 84°10-l/2' East 323.18 
feet along a fence; thence North 41°57' East 
61.04 feet along a fence; thence North 
37°55' East 166.14 feet along a fence; 
thence North 52*18' East 37.64 feet along a 
fence; thence North 73°13' East 26.42 feet 
along a fence; thence North 83*51' East 
59.36 feet along a fence; thence South 7*29' 
East 194.82 feet; thence South 13*01' West 
83.42 feet; thence South 1*53' West 129.41 
feet; thence South 16*38' East 9.43 feet; 
thence West 157.74 feet; thence North 39.08 
feet; thence West 160 feet; thence South 
45.20 feet; thence North 36*26' West 92.31 
feet; thence North 8b°l2' West 48.11 feet; 
thence South 64*03' West 54.05 feet; thence 
South 74*46-1/2' West 130.92 feet; thence 
North 3*05' East 158.62 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
ADDENDUM "B1 ,W T I 
HOWARD F. HATCH 
P.O.BOX 190 
PROVO, UT 84603 
(801) 377-3400/3440 13034 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HOWARD F. HATCH, MARJORIE S. HATCH 
& UNIVERSITY AVENUE DEVELOPMENT 
ASSOCIATES, a Ltd. Partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
LIS PENDENS 
-vs-
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
and VIRGINIA FLYNN Civil No: £l> 6 f 5~~ 
Defendants, 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above action concerning 
and affecting the real property described herein under Exhibit 
"A" attached was commenced on the 4th day of May, 1983 and 
that Plaintiffs are asking for as one of their prayers for 
relief the return of the subject premises. 
DATED this 4th day of May, 1983. 
Howard F. Hatch, pro se 
Marj^rie S. Hatch, pro se 
n^, 
£ 
CD 
CD 
K 
O 
EXHIBIT "A 
The following described real property lying in 
Utah County, Utah. 
Beginning at a point on the East side of Carterville Road, which 
point is North 829.45 feet and East 1398.23 feet from the West 
Quarter Corner of Section 25, Township 6 South, Range 2 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 3 05' East 62.66 feet; 
thence South 84°10V East 323.18 feet along a fence; thence North 
41 57* East 61.04 feet along a fence; thence North 37°55l East 
166.14 feet along a fence; thence North 52°18' East 37.64 feet 
along a fence; thence North 73 13' East 26,42 feet along a fence; 
thence North 83 51' East 59.36 feet along a fence; thence South 
7°29' East 194.82 feet; thence South 13°0r West 83.42 feet; 
thence South 1°53' West 129.41 feet; thence South 16°38' East 
9.43 feet; thence West 157.74 feet; thence North 39.08 feet; 
thence West 160 feet; thence South 45.20 feet; thence North 
36°26f West 92.31 feet; thence North 85°12f West 48.11 feet; 
thence South 64°03' West 54.05 feet; thence South 74°46V 
West 130.92 feet; thence North 3°05l East 158.62 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
LESS: Beginning at a point on the corner of the East edge of 
Carterville Road and on the South edge of Hope Lane, which point 
is North 884.66 feet and East 1,403.79 feet, more or less, from 
the West Quarter Corner of Section 25, Township 6 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 84°10V East 100 
feet along a hedge and fence on the South side of Hope Lane; 
thence South 3°05' West 70 feet; thence North 84°10V West 100 
feet to the east edge of Carterville Road; thence North 3 05' 
East 70 feet along the east side of Carterville Road to the point 
of beginning. 
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of OuroofTillo BooaU tteooa Bort* 3«09f 
TB Coot «0oof too OOBB tteo of 
CoBtof iUo Bao4 to t t e poiot of teaiaoiBf. \ 
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STATt Or UTAH > 
I SS 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On May 4, 1913, personally appeared before mm 
Arnold *. Brown who being by as duly sworn, did say that 
Arnold w. Brown is a Vies Prssidsnt of lions First national 
Bank, and that ths within and foregoing instrument was 
signed in behalf of ssid national Association by authority 
of a resolution of ita Board of Dirsctors, and said Arnold 
n. Brown duly acknowls^ed to mm that said national Association 
executed the sa 
Notary Public 
OOSSRISS ion Expires: 
6-2-85 Residing in Ores, Utah County,Utah. 
